to be interpreted as "at least as probable as," over a family of events, then under what conditions can we construct an order preserving, additive probability measure? A counter-example du'e to Kraft, Pratt, and Seidenberg [9] shows that certain obvious necessary conditions, which define what has been called a qualitative probability (see, e.g., p. 295 of [lo] or p. 32 of [Ill) , arg insuficient to guarantee the existence of such a measure. Sufficient conditions for a finitely additive measure have been presented by de Finetti [4] , Koopman [5] , [B] , [7] , and Savage [ll] . They all involve, either explicitly or implicitly, the strong property that for each integer n the universal event can be partitioned into n events that are equally probable under the given ordering. Among other things, this forces the family of events to be infinite. The existence of countably additive measures has been studied by Villegas [14] .
This paper provides still another axiomatization for the finitely additive representation; it is of interest because it does not demand arbitrarily fine partitions into equally, likely events-in fact, finite models of the axioms exist. The proof is also of some inherent interest because it depends upon a theorem from the theory of extensive measurement. The parallel between the additivity of probability and of extensive measures has always been apparent, but to my knowledge no intimate connection between them has been previously shown. The reason is that the additivity of probability only holds for certain pairs of events-disjoint ones-whereas in the classical theory of extensive measurement (see [2] , [3] , [12] , and [13] ) additivity holds over all pairs of entities without any restriction. However, Behrend [I] and Luce and Marley [9] , in attempts to make extensive measurement more realistic, have shown that an additive representation can still be constructed when only certain pairs of entities can be concatenated. Their result, which is stated fully in Section 3, is used to prove the present probability theorem.
2. The axioms and representation theorem. A preliminary definition is needed. It states, in essence, what we shall mean by an event having, qualitatively, a probability equal to that of n disjoint copies of a given event. DEFINITION 1. Let X be a non-empty set, A a family of subsets of X that includes @ and that is closed under complementation and union, and an (i) al = bl and bl -a,
a. To gain an intuitive idea of the meaning of a standard series and the role it will play, note that a? = bl u cl , where bl -a, c1 -a, and bl n c1 = @, a i +~ = bi u ci, where bi -a i , cc -a, and b i n ci = @.
Thus, ai+l is equal to an event that is the disjoint union of one that is indifferent to ai and another that is indifferent to a. So, crudely, ai is an event that acts like the union of i mutually disjoint events each of which is indifferent to a; however, since i such events may not exist, the definition has to be somewhat indirect.
If a finitely additive, order preserving probability measure p exists, then by induction it is easily seen that p(ai) = @(a). Therefore, if p(a) > 0, the standard series must be finite. The qualitative restatement of this is one of the two new axioms in the following definition. DEFIEITION 2. Let X be a non-empty set, A family of subsets of X that includes @ and that is closed under complementation and union, and >, a binary relation on A. The triple (X, A, >,) is called a regular system of qualitative probability if, for all a, b, c, d e A, the following five axioms hold?
( 1) 2 is a weak ordering of A.
(2) a 2 @ and X > @. (5) If a > @, then any standard series relative to a is finite.
The first three axioms, which are necessary whenever a non-trivial finitely additive representation exists, define what is called a qualitative probability structure. The fourth axiom is a somewhat weaker, and so more acceptable, version of the assert,ion that if a and b are disjoint and dominate c and d, respectively, then there are disjoint subsets of a u b that are equivalent in probability to c and cl. I t is not a necessary condition. The last axiom, which is really an Archimedian property, states in essence that any event that is strictly more prqbable than the null event behaves as if it has non-zero probability. It is a
We define > and -in terms of 2 in the usual way.
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The following is to be proved. , 2 ) is. a..regular system of qualitative probability, then there exists a unique, jinitely additive probability measure p over A that preserves the order of 2 , i.e., for all a, b E A: (i) a 2 b if and only if p(a) 2 p(b).
(ii) 0 $ p(a) 5 1.
(iii) p(@) = 0 and p ( X ) = 1.
(iv) If a n b = @, then p(a u b) = p(a) + p(b).
As was indicated in the introduction, the proof involves reducing this assertion to a result in the theory of estensive measurement. This theorem is stated next.
3.
A result from the theory of extensive measurement. ( 1) R is a weak ordering of A. is defined and ( ( n -l)x, x) E B, then define nx = ( n -1 ) s 0 x. For all x, y E A, the set {n I n is a positive integer and yRnxj is jinite.
In this system, Axiom 2 captures associativity; Axiom 3 both insures commutativity and that inequalities are preserved when the same element is concatenated with both terms; Axiom 4 asserts that the system is complete in the sense that certain equations can be solved; Axiom 5 excludes both zero and negative elements; and Axiom 6 is a suitable formulation of the Archimedean property when only some pairs of elements can be concatenated. The theory in [9] also deals with extensive systems that have maximal elements in the f,ollowing special sense: a E A is maximal relative to R and o if for all x E A, aRx, and if for some x E A, (a, x) E B. As the proof of Theorem 1 does not require the results for the case when there is a maximal element, I do not state them here.
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Suppose that there is no a for which both a > @ and ci > @. Then a E A implies either a E pi or a E X, and We now prove that (A*, B, R, o), where A* = (A/-) -6 and R is the restriction of >N/-to A*, is an extensive system without a maximal element (Definition 3). Note that A* excludes events of qualitative probability zero; they are reinstated later.
(1) R is obviously a strict ordering of A* since, by Axiom 1, 2 is a weak ordering of A. that (a, b ) E B, where a n b = @. Since b > @, it follow from Lemma 5 that a u b > a, and so not aRa 0 b.
(6) Finally, we show that { n 1 bRna) is finite, where na = ( n -l ) a 0 a and l a = a. We do this by showing that the existence of na implies the existence of a standard series relative to a that hasn elements. Because a E A*, a > @, and so by Axiom 5 any such series must he finite; therefore there exists some integer n z such that na is not defined for n > m. Suppose that 2a kxists, then by definition of 0 there exist al = bl E a and s E a such that bl n c1 = @ and az = 61 u c~ E 2a.
Suppose that na exists and that, for i 5 n -1, we have constructed a standard series a , relative to a, with auxiliary b,-l and ci-1, and that ai E ia. We extend it to i = n. By definition of 0, there exist 6,-1 E (n -1 )a and c,,-1 e a such that 6, -1 n en-1 = @ and 6,-1 u c,-1 E na. Thus, if we set a,, = b,-1 u en-1 , the series is Select that cp for which cp(X) = 1 and, for a E A, define
Using the properties of cp and Lemma 6, it is easy to see that p fulfills the assertions of the theorem. A/loreover p is unique since if another such function existed there would be an additive measure in the extensive system not related to cp by a multiplicative constant, thus violating part (iii) of Theorem 2. Q.E.D. THEOREM 3. If 2 is a qualitative probability on 2X that is fine and tight, then (X, 2X, 2) is a regular system of qualitative probability.
PROOF. Since Axioms 1-3 are assumed, it is sufficient to prove 4 and 5.
Suppose that a n b = @, a > c, and b 2 d. Since 2 is fine, Theorem 3, p. 37 of [ll] states that there exists a unique probability 1ne:tsure 11 tlmt almost agrees wit11 ,> (i.e., a ,> 6 irnpliesp(a) 2 p ( It is obvious that the converse of Theorem 3 is false sincesavage's assumptions imply that X is infinite whereas the ordering induced by the uniform distribution on a finite set satisfies Definition 2.
